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     *Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
Case No:  06-2200
    EDWARD CHUNG,
                     Petitioner
         v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                       Respondent
                    
On Petition for Review of Final Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A36-360-060
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Walt Durling
                    
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 7, 2007
BEFORE:  SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and
POLLAK,* District Judge
(Filed: June 13,  2007)
                    
OPINION
                    
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
2Edward Chung is a native and citizen of Guyana.  He entered the United States on
November 12, 1977.  Chung had four children in the United States and became a legal
permanent resident.  Chung testified that he returned to Guyana in 1978 to get married,
but has otherwise had no contact with Guyana since his arrival in the United States.
On November 1, 2004, Chung was indicted in the United States District Court for
the District of New Hampshire on five counts of distributing cocaine base.  Chung pled
guilty to all five counts.  The District Court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’
confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $500 assessment.
The Department of Homeland Security charged Chung with removability due to
his conviction for an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and for illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance. Id. at § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Chung conceded
removability and sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),
claiming that criminal deportees to Guyana were routinely held indefinitely or targeted by
death squads.
On November 7, 2005, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Chung’s claim for
relief under the CAT and ordered him removed to Guyana.  The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.
Chung testified that many criminal deportees are tortured or murdered upon their
return to Guyana.  Chung stated that returning criminal deportees are monitored and their
pictures are placed in newspapers.  Chung claimed that it was “possible” that he would be
targeted by death squads if he was removed to Guyana, although he did not know of
3anyone who had been killed after deportation.  Chung testified that before deportees are
released, someone must sign for them.  As Chung has no family in Guyana, he claimed
that he could be detained indefinitely and tortured, particularly if his captors felt that they
could extract money from him.
We generally have jurisdiction over petitions to review final orders of removal.  8
U.S.C. § 1252.  However, Chung has committed an aggravated felony within the meaning
of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Therefore, we may only “review constitutional claims
and questions of law [which] includes review of the BIA’s application of law to
undisputed fact.”  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation
omitted); see Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are
limited to pure questions of law and to issues of application of law to fact, where the facts
are undisputed and not the subject of challenge.” (internal citations and quotations marks
omitted)).
We held in Kamara v. Attorney General that we could reach the merits of an
aggravated felon’s CAT claim when “[t]he BIA’s erroneous application of the regulations
is evident in its opinion.”  420 F.3d at 214.  In Kamara, the IJ granted CAT relief but was
then overturned by the BIA.  Id. at 213-14.  The IJ’s findings of fact were undisputed.  Id. 
However, we vacated the BIA’s decision as they had improperly applied to the stipulated
facts the requirement that the petitioner show that “it is more likely than not that he faces
torture by a public official” to establish a claim for relief under the CAT.  Id. at 213.  We
also reached the merits of a CAT claim made by a criminal deportee to Haiti because
4“[t]he question [there] involve[d] not disputed facts but whether the facts, even when
accepted as true, sufficiently demonstrate[d] that it [was] more likely than not that she
will be subject to persecution or torture upon removal to Haiti.”  Toussaint v. Attorney
General, 455 F.3d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 2006).
It is apparent from Chung’s brief, which did not address the jurisdictional issue,
that he is challenging the IJ’s factual determinations.  Chung alleged that he would be
held indefinitely upon his return to Guyana because he has no family there to sign for him
and effect his release.  The IJ found, however, that Chung had failed to meet his burden to
establish this fact, as “it is not quantifiable from the evidence that he is likely to be
detained for any length of time other than for airport processing upon his arrival.”  The IJ
made a similar finding with respect to Chung’s argument that he would be targeted by
death squads.  Chung also contended that returning criminal deportees were targeted and
detained indefinitely because they had committed crimes in other countries.  The IJ found
the record did not support this contention.  The IJ allowed that both indefinite detention
and targeted murder may occur, but were linked to criminal activity by deportees after
their return.
These disputed issues of fact lie beyond our jurisdiction, unlike the questions of
law, and of law applied to undisputed fact, in Toussaint and Kamara.
Chung also alleges that the BIA violated his rights to due process by erroneously
attributing conclusions of fact to the IJ and by citing “inapplicable law.”  The BIA did
neither.  The BIA’s statements that the death squads were acting outside the scope of
5government authority and that targeting was linked to ongoing criminal activity are both
supported by the IJ’s findings.  The Board’s citations to their own and to our precedents
were appropriate and relevant.  Chung understandably disagrees with the BIA’s
conclusion, but “the question for due process purposes is not whether the BIA reached the
correct decision; rather, it is simply whether the Board made an individualized
determination of [Chung’s] interests.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir.
2001).  The BIA did not violate Chung’s due process rights because it relied only on facts
found by the IJ, gave him the opportunity to present arguments on his behalf, and
examined his individual claim.  See id. at 549.
We will deny the petition for review.
